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Abstract
This paper analyzes in a spatial framework how much information a seller dis-
closes about the variety he sells when he faces a buyer with a privately known
taste for variety. I identify an equilibrium in which, for each possible variety, the
sellers optimal strategy consists of either fully disclosing the variety or disclosing
how far it is from the buyers expected taste. The set of varieties the seller fully
discloses monotonically expands as the buyers taste for variety becomes stronger.
I show that this is the unique undefeated equilibrium. From a policy perspective,
mandating full disclosure is generally socially harmful.
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1 Introduction
A large literature has analyzed how much information a privately-informed seller vol-
untarily reveals when consumers are unable to tell the quality of a product prior to
purchase. In their seminal papers, Grossman [1981], Grossman and Hart [1980] and
Milgrom [1981] show that the seller fully reveals quality as long as there is a credible
and costless means of conveying it. The primary force behind this nding is the fact
that consumerswillingness-to-pay is strictly increasing in perceived quality. Therefore,
a high-quality seller would always reveal its quality and distinguish itself from its own
lower-quality images. As this reasoning applies to all seller types, if quality information
is withheld, then it can only be the lowest-quality seller. Thus, information unravels.
Accordingly, mandatory disclosure rules are redundant because disclosure is costless and
the seller voluntarily reveals quality regardless of its value.
Many goods are characterized by several attributes some of which are horizontal.
However, very little attention has been paid to veriable information disclosure when
consumers are unable to observe horizontal attributes of a good. The main objective of
this paper is to characterize the extent of information disclosure and the resulting social
e¢ ciency in such environments, and compare the results with those of quality disclosure.
In contrast to a vertical attribute such as quality, consumers rank di¤erent varieties of
a horizontal attribute di¤erently. Geographical location of a hotel, expertise area of a
researcher or sweetness of a wine are a few examples.
It is a priori unclear to what extent the unraveling argument works, if at all, when
consumer uncertainty concerns a horizontal attribute. The seller may choose to provide
only partial information, thereby bringing the perceived attribute closer to the ideal
taste of the average buyer. For example, many rms these days engage in the practice
of opaqueselling. Hotwire.com and Priceline.com are two prominent examples in the
travel industry. Along with several transparentoptions, they o¤er travel products whose
characteristics (e.g., the airline company and the departure/arrival time in case of air
tickets, or the name and the geographic location in case of hotels) are not transparent at
the time of purchase.1 Although certain characteristics of the product are revealed before
1People who have memberships with di¤erent airline alliances to accumulate miles will have di¤erent
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purchase (e.g., the range of departure and arrival times for air tickets, or the approximate
geographic location indicated by a circle on the map for hotels), participating consumers
run the risk of receiving a product that they do not prefer much.2 Similarly, a consumer
can rent a compact-size car on Hotwire.com, but the supplier (e.g., Avis, Budget, Hertz
or Dollar) is not revealed until after purchase.3
To analyze the extent of information disclosure in such environments, I consider a
simple sales encounter in which there is a single seller (he) and a single buyer (she).
The good is characterized by a single horizontal attribute, which I call variety. The
seller is privately informed about the variety of the good while the buyer is privately
informed about her ideal taste for the variety. Traditionally, markets with goods that
have horizontal attributes have been analyzed using spatial models, and I continue in
this tradition. Accordingly, the variety of the good and the buyers ideal taste for it are
represented by particular locations along a unit line à la Hotelling [1929], and the buyer
strictly prefers a variety that is closer to her ideal taste. Prior to a possible transaction,
the seller chooses a price and makes a report about the variety of the good. The only
restriction I impose on the report is that it must be truthful. Thus, possible reports
range from very precise (revealing the exact variety) to very vague (staying silent). The
buyer observes the price and the report, and responds by purchasing one unit of the good
or none.
I identify a class of payo¤-equivalent perfect Bayesian equilibria (PBE) in which the
information regarding the distance between the variety of the good and the expected
ideal taste of the buyer (from the sellers point of view) fully unravels.4 That is, the
buyer always learns how far the variety is from her ex ante expected ideal taste, but not
necessarily on which side. The seller fully reveals the variety if and only if the buyers
preferences for airline companies. Similarly, two businessmen visiting a city for di¤erent business activi-
ties will have di¤erent preferences for ight times or hotel locations depending on where and when their
business activities take place. So, these are horizontal attributes.
2Most o­ ine travel agencies follow similar practices for all-inclusive travel packages, not revealing
the airline company operating the ight or the name/location of the hotel.
3Another interesting example is Fukubukuro.This is a Japanese New Years Day tradition where
retailers create lucky bagswith a collection of random items not seen by buyers until after purchase
and sell them for a substantial discount.
4Possible PBE within this class di¤er only in terms of the equilibrium strategy of the seller, though
all lead to the same payo¤s.
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preference for her ideal taste is su¢ ciently strong, and the set of fully revealed varieties
monotonically shrinks (from all to (almost) none) as the buyers preference for her ideal
taste becomes weaker. Hence, information unraveling is still in e¤ect, but not to the
fullest extent. Moreover, this class of PBE defeatsall other PBE that may exist.5
From the sellers point of view, the probability of a purchase is higher when the variety
of the good is closer to the expected ideal taste of the buyer. When it is not su¢ ciently
close, the seller is tempted to disclose only partial information so as to bring the buyers
perceived variety (i.e., the expected variety conditional on the report received) closer
to her expected ideal taste. However, such a report leaves some uncertainty regarding
the true variety. The buyer dislikes uncertainty in the sense that her willingness-to-
pay would be higher had the seller made a precise report indicating the same perceived
variety without any uncertainty. Thus, there are two opposing factors the seller takes
into account when deciding what report to make: (i) eradicating buyer uncertainty by
fully revealing the variety, and (ii) bringing the perceived variety closer to the expected
ideal taste of the buyer by disclosing partial information. The buyer understands that her
expected ideal taste acts as a reference point for the seller. This leads her to associate a
partially-revealing report with the variety that is farthest away from this reference point.
Therefore, in situations when the seller discloses partial information, he never includes in
his report varieties that are more distant from the expected ideal taste of the buyer than
the true variety is. Since the seller employs the same strategy for all possible varieties,
the distance between the true variety of the good and the expected ideal taste of the
buyer fully unravels.
It may be easier to see the unraveling result with an example. As described before,
the variety as well as the buyers ideal taste are represented by locations over the unit line
[0; 1]. Suppose that the expected ideal taste of the buyer is 1
2
and that, in equilibrium,
the seller fully reveals the varieties in [0:4; 0:6] and makes a report in the form [x; 1  x]
for each other variety x. Consider the case when the seller makes a report saying that
the variety belongs to [0:3; 0:7]. In this case, the buyer rationally infers that the true
variety must be either 0:3 or 0:7 because had the variety been closer to 1
2
, the seller would
5The concept of undefeatedequilibria is due to Mailath, Okuno-Fujiwara and Postlewaite [1993].
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have made a report that indicated a smaller maximum distance from 1
2
(if, for instance,
x = 0:65, then the seller would be better o¤ sending [0:35; 0:65] rather than [0:3; 0:7]).
Hence, the degree of mismatch between the variety and the expected ideal taste of the
buyer fully unravels.
The strength of the buyers preference for her ideal taste plays an important role
in the determination of which varieties are fully revealed. When it is weak, the buyer
perceives di¤erent varieties as close substitutes, so uncertainty about the variety does
not lower her willingness-to-pay too much. In this case, the sellers incentive to disclose
partial information is higher. Similarly, when it is strong, the seller has a higher incentive
to make a precise report since uncertainty signicantly lowers the buyers willingness-to-
pay. This relationship is monotonic in the strength of the buyers preference for her ideal
taste, and therefore, the set of fully revealed varieties expands as it becomes stronger.
Whether mandatory disclosure rules are benecial or not has been an important ques-
tion. According to the literature on quality disclosure, mandatory rules are redundant
because the seller voluntarily reveals the quality regardless of its value. I reach a similar
nding in this paper. I nd that a social planner cannot improve welfare by mandating
the seller to fully reveal a particular variety that the seller voluntarily does not, while
such a policy is often socially harmful. The intuition for this nding is as follows. By
providing full information, the seller improves the match between the buyer and the
product, thereby creating additional surplus for those buyers who have a good match.
In case of partial disclosure, on the other hand, the seller faces a larger expected de-
mand compared to full disclosure. This demand enlargement e¤ect of disclosing partial
information dominates the surplus created by providing full information, and as a result,
forcing the seller to fully reveal a variety that he voluntarily does not is often socially
harmful.
The basic model allows several extensions. I discuss these in section 5. Most impor-
tantly, buyer uncertainty about a vertical attribute (say, quality) can easily be incorpo-
rated. In this case, the usual unraveling story applies with respect to quality disclosure.
Thus, regardless of the buyers prior beliefs for it, quality would be fully revealed in every
PBE. Accordingly, all the main results about variety disclosure remain the same.
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Many authors have studied veriable information disclosure in di¤erent contexts.
However, most of them focus on vertical attributes. Examples include Jovanovic [1982]
in which information disclosure is costly, Matthews and Postlewaite [1985] who allow
the seller to decide whether to acquire quality information or not, Fishman and Hagerty
[1990] who analyze how much discretion a seller should be allowed in choosing how much
information to disclose about quality, Shin [1994] who incorporates uncertainty about the
degree of information the seller possesses about quality, Board [2009], Cheong and Kim
[2004], Hotz and Xiao [2010], Levin, Peck and Ye [2009], Milgrom and Roberts [1986] and
Stivers [2004] who analyze quality disclosure in competitive environments,6 Jin [2005], Jin
and Leslie [2003] and Lewis [2011] who examine quality disclosure empirically, Daughety
and Reinganum [2008] who incorporate the possibility of signaling quality by price into
the standard disclosure framework, and Kartik [2009] who studies a unied model of
veriable disclosure and cheap talk à la Crawford and Sobel [1982].7
Three closely related papers that analyze disclosure of horizontal attributes are Sun
[2011], Balestrieri and Izmalkov [2011] and Koessler and Renault [2011]. Sun [2011]
considers a very similar problem in which the seller is constrained to either fully reveal
all product information or stay silent. She nds that the set of seller types who reveal
full information shrinks as quality increases when the buyer is uncertain only about the
location. When the buyer is uncertain about both location and quality, she nds the
opposite result; i.e., the set of seller types who reveal full information expands as the
actual quality increases. Balestrieri and Izmalkov [2011] investigate a similar problem
employing a mechanism design approach. Assuming that the product is located at either
end of the unit line, they nd that the optimal mechanism may involve full disclosure, no
disclosure, or an option for the buyer to pay for product information prior to purchase.
Koessler and Renault [2011] study a more general model that allows for both horizontal
and vertical di¤erentiation, and characterize the conditions under which a monopolist
6Hotz and Xiao [2010] and Levin, Peck and Ye [2009] also allow for horizontal product attributes.
However, they assume that these are commonly known by consumers.
7See also Kamenica and Gentzkow [2011] who study how a sender can inuence the decision of a
rational agent by controlling her informational environment, and Rayo and Segal [2010] who examine
optimal information disclosure when both the sender and the receiver possess private information. Dif-
ferently from the classical disclosure literature, however, both papers assume that the sender credibly
commits to a disclosure policy prior to learning his private information.
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fully reveals product characteristics. They nd that full revelation is always an equi-
librium if product and consumer types are independently distributed. Moreover, they
identify the conditions under which full revelation is the unique outcome.
Other related papers are Lewis and Sappington [1994], Anderson and Renault [2006]
and Johnson and Myatt [2006]. Lewis and Sappington [1994] examine the trade-o¤ that a
seller faces in deciding how much knowledge to endow buyers of their idiosyncratic tastes
for the product. While improved information facilitates price discrimination through
which the seller can capture some of the extra surplus, it also leads to some buyers
earning informational rents. If the buyers acquire no information, on the other hand, the
seller can fully capture the surplus of the averagebuyer. They nd that the seller nds
it optimal either to endow buyers with the most precise information or to provide no new
information. Johnson and Myatt [2006] consider a general framework that builds upon
the intuition that many economic activities including informative advertising inuence
the dispersion of consumer valuations, leading to a rotation in the demand curve. They
nd that prots are a U-shaped function of the dispersion of consumer valuations in
many circumstances and, as a result, similar to Lewis and Sappington [1994], the seller
pursues either maximal dispersion (niche-market strategy), serving high-value buyers at
a high price, or minimal dispersion (mass-market strategy), serving a large fraction of
buyers at a lower price. Anderson and Renault [2006] analyze the conditions under which
a monopolist chooses to advertise price information and/or product match information.
They introduce threshold matchadvertising whereby a consumer learns whether her
willingness-to-pay for the product is above or below a threshold. They show that a
monopolist does better by advertising threshold match rather than full match. They also
nd that a monopolist may publicize only price, only match, or both depending on the
value of the search cost consumers face.8
In all of the three papers above, buyers are ex-ante identical and the seller has no
private information. Buyersmatch value with the product is a random draw from a
probability distribution that is known to both the monopolist and the consumer. There-
8See also Anderson and Renault [2009] which considers comparative advertising in a duopoly setting
in which rms can also advertise their rivals product characteristics, and Anderson and Renault [2011]
which extends Anderson and Renault [2006] by introducing quality disclosure.
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fore, the particular way the seller reveals information is uninformative for buyers. Buyers
make no inferences, for instance, if the seller does not reveal any information.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, I introduce
the basic model. In sections 3 and 4, I characterize the equilibrium level of information
disclosure and investigate its social welfare properties. In section 5, I discuss possible
extensions to the main model. Finally, in section 6, I present the concluding remarks.
2 Model
A prot-maximizing seller (S) o¤ers a good (G) for sale which is characterized by a
location over the unit interval, denoted by x 2 [0; 1]. The location here indicates the
variety of G, such as color, sweetness, etc. S is privately informed about x. I will use
masculine pronouns for S and sometimes refer to x as Ss type. The production costs do
not depend on x, and without loss of generality, are assumed to be zero.
On the other side of the market, there is a single potential buyer (B) who has a unit
demand for G. Bs ideal taste, which describes the particular variety of G that she ideally
wants to consume, is described by a location  2 [0; 1]. This is private knowledge of B.
Similarly, I will use feminine pronouns for B and sometimes refer to  as Bs type. If B
buys a unit of G at a price P , then her net utility is v   t(   x)2   P , where v is the
gross utility B enjoys when the variety of G perfectly matches with her ideal taste (i.e.,
when x = ) and t measures the degree of disutility B incurs when x and  di¤er from
each other.9 Not buying G yields zero utility. If B buys a unit of G, then Ss payo¤ is
P . Otherwise, S gets zero payo¤.
The timing of the game is as follows. First, Nature selects a value for x 2 [0; 1]
from a strictly positive density function f (x) which is symmetric around 1
2
, and a value
for  from a uniform density function dened over [0; 1]. Hence, the ex-ante expected
value of both the location of G and the ideal taste of B is 1
2
. S privately observes x
while B privately observes . After observing x, S sends a truthful and costless message
M  [0; 1], and chooses a price P to which he commits thereafter.10 As a tie-breaking
rule, I assume in case of an indi¤erence between two or more messages that S sends the
9Alternatively, v can be interpreted as the quality of G. See section 5 for further discussion.
10A message is truthful when x 2M .
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most precise message. B observes M and P , and then decides whether to buy G or not.
Finally, the payo¤s are realized. All aspects of the game are common knowledge.
It is necessary to make a few remarks about the model. First, note that Bs utility
function is strictly concave in (  x). This means that B dislikes uncertainty about the
location of G. For instance, at a given price, a precise messageM =

1
2
	
is more favorable
for B than a message M =

1
2
  "; 1
2
+ "

which implies a conditional expected value of
1
2
for x. Second, although I assume a single buyer with a privately known ideal taste,
the results are identical with a continuum of buyers whose ideal tastes are uniformly
distributed over the unit line. These two specications are equivalent. Third, B has a
unit demand in my model. This is without loss of generality because, as it will be clear
later, the probability of a purchase declines with price. In other words, despite the unit
demand assumption, S faces a downward-sloping expected demand function. Fourth, I
assume that S makes his reporting and pricing decisions simultaneously and that price is
observed by B prior to purchase. The simultaneity assumption is not crucial; S may make
his reporting and pricing decisions in any order. However, it is crucial that B observes
the price prior to purchase and S commits to the price he chooses. Finally, in line with
the quality disclosure literature, I focus on truthful and costless messages.
The location of the good, x, is exogenously given in this paper. However, it is possible
to allow S to inuence it. Consider a production process in which the choice of location
is subject to an error and S chooses a target location for G (for instance, sweetness of
a wine crucially depends on the climate which is di¢ cult to predict beforehand). The
realized value of the error then determines the nal location of G. Assuming that B knows
the distribution of the error, her prior beliefs for the nal location will be dened over
a subset of [0; 1]. In fact, if the error term has a zero-mean symmetric distribution, S
chooses a target location of 1
2
since this is the expected ideal taste of B from his point of
view. In this case, Bs prior beliefs for x will be symmetric around 1
2
.
I use the concept of perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE) to solve the model. Let m(x)
describe the reporting strategy of S which is a mapping from [0; 1] to all subsets of [0; 1]
such that x 2 m. This determines what message S sends as a function of his private
information. Let p (x jM) denote the pricing strategy of S when the message he sends
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is M . Similarly, let b(;M; P ) describe the buying strategy of B, where b = 1 if she buys
G and b = 0 if she does not. Finally, let  describe how B updates her beliefs based on
the message and the price chosen by S. Thus,  (z jM;P ) is the probability density B
assigns to x = z when S sends a messageM and chooses a price P . A PBE for this game
is then dened as follows.
Denition A PBE for this game is a quadruple  = (b; p;m; ) which is characterized
by the following four conditions:
(D.1) For all M and P , b is Bs best buying decision:
b(;M; P ) =

1,
R 1
0
(v   t(  x)2   P )(x jM;P )dx  0
0, otherwise
:
(D.2) Given (D.1), p is the price that maximizes Ss expected revenue when he sends a
message M :
p(x jM) = argmax
P
Z 1
0
b(;M; P )Pd.
(D.3) Given (D.1) and (D.2), m is the message that maximizes Ss expected revenue
subject to x 2 m:
m(x) = arg max
Mfxg
Z 1
0
b (;M; p(x jM)) p(x jM)d.
(D.4) Let 
 describe the set of locations that induce S to send a message M and choose a
price P , i.e., 
 = fx j m =M; p = Pg. Then, for all M and P such that 
 6= ;,
B updates her beliefs in the following way:
(x jM;P ) =
( f(x)R
x2

f(x)dx
, x 2 

0, otherwise
.
(D.1) states that, for any observed messageM and price P , B decides to buy a unit of
G only if, given her updated beliefs, her expected net utility is non-negative. S rationally
anticipates Bs best response to any given M and P , and chooses the best price and
message that maximize his expected revenue,
R 1
0
b(;M; P )Pd. These are stated in
(D.2) and (D.3). Finally, (D.4) states that B rationally anticipates the price and the
message S chooses for each x, and updates her beliefs about x in a Bayesian way for any
observed M and P .
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3 Equilibrium information disclosure
In this section, I investigate the properties of equilibrium information disclosure. I start
with a benchmark case in which S knows Bs type while B is uncertain about the variety
x. I show that full disclosure is the unique outcome in this case. This will later help
me answer whether B would have any incentive to reveal her type to S if she had such
an opportunity. I then move to the analysis of two-sided asymmetric information and
identify a class of PBE with partial disclosure. Finally, in subsection 3.3, I discuss other
PBE and then argue that the PBE I identify in subsection 3.2 is the only undefeated
PBE.
3.1 A benchmark case: One-sided asymmetric information
Suppose S knows Bs type. In this case, for a given message M , he will charge a price
P = v   tE [(  x)2 j x 2 
] and enjoy a revenue equal to P , where 
 is the set of
locations that induce S to send a message M . In other words, S will optimally choose a
price that leaves no surplus to B. Obviously, S fully reveals x when it perfectly overlaps
with Bs taste; i.e., when x = . This allows him to charge a price and earn a revenue of
v. When x is farther away from , S would ideally want to pool with the locations that
are closer to , thus lowering the expected mismatch E [(  x)2 j x 2 
] and increasing
the price. However, as this reasoning applies to all types of S, B infers from such a
pooling message that x cannot be any closer to  than the farthest location included
in the message. To see this, suppose  < 1
2
and take a variety x =    " for some
" 2 (0; ]. Suppose that S sends a message M = [  "; + "]. If B naively interpreted
this message, then S would charge a price P = v   t R +"
 " (   x)2 dF (x)F (+") F ( ") and B
would buy. However, a rational B would realize that the types of S with j  xj < "
would never pool with x =    " or x =  + ". Instead, they would send a message
M = [  j  xj ; + j  xj] which would enable them to charge a higher price and
enjoy a higher revenue. Thus, B infers that x is equal to either   " or  + " following
a message M = [  "; + "].
Given the above argument, S can do no better than revealing x fully because he can
never induce B to believe that the variety is closer to her ideal taste than it actually is.
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In other words, the distance between the variety and Bs ideal taste, j  xj, e¤ectively
becomes a vertical attribute and it therefore fully unravels in every PBE.11 Given the
tie-breaking assumption in favor of more precise reports, S fully reveals x in the unique
PBE and earns a revenue equal to P = v  t(  x)2. B, on the other hand, always buys
G but does not derive any consumer surplus.
3.2 Two-sided asymmetric information
In this subsection, I turn back to the analysis of two-sided asymmetric information. I
rst describe Bs optimal behavior for a given message and price. I then describe the
optimal message and the price S chooses for each x, taking Bs optimal behavior given.
The main result is stated in Proposition 2 which provides a description of equilibrium
information disclosure.
Bs optimal behavior is summarized by (D.1) and (D.4). Given a message M and a
price P , she updates her beliefs about x, as described in (D.4), and buys G if and only
if her net expected surplus from buying is non-negative, as described in (D.1). Thus,
b(;M; P ) = 1, v   tE (  x)2 j x 2 
  P  0, (1)
where 
 is, as described in (D.4), the set of locations that induce S to send a message
M and choose a price P . Solving expression (1) for  yields
L = max
(
0; E [x j x 2 
] 
r
v   P
t
  V ar [x j x 2 
]
)
, (2)
H = min
(
1; E [x j x 2 
] +
r
v   P
t
  V ar [x j x 2 
]
)
, (3)
where L (H) is the lowest (highest) type of B that buys G when S sends a message M
and chooses a price P .
Since S is uncertain about , he takes Bs optimal behavior as given and chooses a
message and a price that maximizes the expected revenue E [bP ] as described in (D.2).
For notational convenience, let D denote the expected demand S faces. This is simply
11The same unraveling argument equally applies when B has a downward-sloping demand at a known
location.
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the probability that  lies between L and H . Since Ss priors for  are uniform over
[0; 1], it is given by
D(P ;x; v; t) = H   L.
As mentioned in the previous section, t measures how strong Bs preference for her
ideal taste is, and v can be interpreted as the quality of G. When t is high, a mismatch
between the variety and Bs ideal taste reduces Bs willingness-to-pay badly. Similarly,
when v is high, consumption of G o¤ers a high utility. Therefore, the expected demand
S faces at a given price is increasing in the value of v
t
.
Analyzing the expected demand function, D(P ;x; v; t), leads to two important obser-
vations. On the one hand, S wants to bring the perceived location of G (i.e., E [x j x 2 
])
as close to the expected ideal taste of B (which is 1
2
) as possible by sending a partially-
revealing message that pools the actual location of G with more central ones. This strictly
raises the expected demand S faces when x is close to 0 or 1. On the other hand, S wants
to keep uncertainty (captured by V ar [x j x 2 
]) as low as possible because B dislikes
it. At times L and H do not bind (i.e., not equal to 0 and 1, respectively), a higher
uncertainty lowers the expected demand. These two factors work against each other, so
Ss optimal decision depends on which factor dominates.
First, consider the situation when x is commonly known (or, equivalently, when S fully
reveals it). Letting a subscript 1 indicate this situation, equations (2) and (3) reduce to
L1 = max
(
0; x 
r
v   P
t
)
,
H1 = min
(
1; x+
r
v   P
t
)
.
Let p1 and R1 denote, for a given (v; t), the optimal price S chooses and the resulting
equilibrium expected revenue he makes when x is known. For a given location x, the
revenue-maximizing price is12
p1(x; v; t) = argmax
P
PD1(P ;x; v; t),
which leads to equilibrium expected revenue S makes
R1(x; v; t) = p1D1(p1; x; v; t).
12The equilibrium value of p1 for all (x; v; t) can be found in section A1 of the appendix.
12
Proposition 1 R1(x; v; t) is strictly increasing for x < min
p
v
3t
; 1
2
	
, constant for
min
p
v
3t
; 1
2
	  x  max1
2
; 1 p v
3t
	
and strictly decreasing for min

1
2
; 1 p v
3t
	
<
x  1.
Proof. See section A2 of the appendix.
From Ss point of view, the likelihood B buys G is higher the closer the location of G
is to the expected ideal taste of B. That is why the revenue S expects under full location
information increases as x gets closer to 1
2
. When v
t
is not too high, neither L1 nor 
H
1
binds (i.e., is not equal to 0 and 1, respectively) at the optimal price S chooses for the
values of x between min
p
v
3t
; 1
2
	
and max

1
2
; 1 p v
3t
	
. Therefore, for these locations,
S is e¤ectively unconstrained and is able to achieve the highest revenue he can. When
x is closer to the edges, on the other hand, either L1 or 
H
1 becomes binding and the
expected demand S faces goes down. Therefore, S earns a lower revenue as x is farther
away from 1
2
. When v
t
is su¢ ciently high, either L1 or 
H
1 is binding for all locations and
therefore R1 attains a unique maximum at x = 12 .
Proposition 1 has an important implication: when B is uncertain about x, Ss optimal
information disclosure strategy calls for fully revealing all locations min
p
v
3t
; 1
2
	  x 
max

1
2
; 1 p v
3t
	
. This is because doing so leads to a revenue of R1(12 ; v; t). Since
neither L1 nor 
H
1 is binding at the optimal price S chooses for these locations, sending
a partially-revealing message cannot improve the expected demand S faces. Note that
x = 1
2
is fully revealed in every PBE regardless of the value of v
t
.
This observation plays a key role in the characterization of equilibrium information
disclosure. Suppose that S fully reveals the locations that lie in (z; 1  z) in equilibrium
and consider the case when x = z. S knows that, regardless of the message he sends, B will
never assign a positive probability to the values of x between z and 1 z because S would
normally fully reveal these locations. In other words, the usual unraveling story is at work
here. In case S chooses not to fully reveal x = z, his problem is to choose a message that
brings the perceived location as close to 1
2
as possible while keeping uncertainty as low as
possible. Since f(x) is symmetric around 1
2
, S can induce a perceived location of exactly
1
2
by sending, for instance, a message M = [z; 1   z]. This message also leads to the
lowest uncertainty that S can induce. In fact, as Proposition 2 describes, Ss equilibrium
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choice reduces to either fully revealing x = z or sending a partially-revealing message
that would induce B to think that x is equal to either z or 1  z.
Proposition 2 There exists a class of payo¤-equivalent PBE in which the value of1
2
  x is always revealed, whereas x is fully revealed if and only if v
t
is su¢ ciently low.
Moreover, the set of fully revealed locations monotonically shrinks as v
t
becomes higher.
Proof. See section A2 of the appendix.
Proposition 2 describes how the information unraveling result extends to markets with
goods that have horizontal attributes. In equilibrium, B understands that her expected
ideal taste acts as a reference point for S. This leads her to adopt a pessimistic posture
in which she associates a partially-revealing message with the location that is farthest
away from this reference point. Therefore, in case S chooses to send a partially-revealing
message, he pools the true location only with the ones that are equally or less distant
from 1
2
. Since S employs the same strategy for all possible locations, the distance between
the true location of G and the expected ideal taste of B fully unravels.
It is important to note that there are many messages that lead to the same equilibrium
outcome. For example, a message M = [z; 1  z] or simply M = fz; 1  zg induces B to
conclude that the true location is either z or 1  z. Multiplicity of equilibrium messages
is typical in veriable information disclosure games. However, since all equilibria are
payo¤-equivalent, it does not change any of the results. It is also important to note that,
in case S sends a partially-revealing message, he would choose the same price for either of
the two locations that are inferred by B since, otherwise, price would signal the location.
So, in equilibrium, price is not informative about location.
Similar with the earlier notation, let a subscript 0 indicate a partially-revealing mes-
sage whereby p0 and R0 denote the optimal price S chooses and the equilibrium expected
revenue he earns when he sends a partially-revealing message. If R0 > R1 for a particular
x, then S chooses to send a partially-revealing message. The revenue S expects to earn in
this case can be found as follows. Suppose x = z and S sends a message M = [z; 1  z].
Bs inference is 
 = fz; 1   zg where she assigns equal probability to each possibility.13
13Note that Bayesrule does not work since both are ex-ante zero-probability events. In this case,
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So,
E [x j x 2 
] = 1
2
,
V ar [x j x 2 
] =

1
2
  z
2
,
and thus equations (2) and (3) reduce to
L0 = max
8<:0; 12  
s
v   P
t
 

1
2
  z
29=; ,
H0 = min
8<:1; 12 +
s
v   P
t
 

1
2
  z
29=; .
Expressing these expressions for a generic x, the revenue-maximizing price is14
p0(x; v; t) = argmax
P
PD0(P ;x; v; t),
where D0(P ;x; v; t) = 
H
0   L0 . This leads to the equilibrium expected revenue S earns
R0(x; v; t) = p0D0(p0; x; v; t).
Compared to full disclosure, sending a partially-revealing message induces S to charge
a lower price. Therefore, if S chooses to send a partially-revealing message rather than a
fully-revealing one, the expected demand he faces in the former case must be larger than
the expected demand he faces in the latter. This is depicted in Figure 1 for v = 0:6,
t = 1 and x = 0:3. The solid curve is the expected demand S faces when x is fully
revealed, D1, and the dashed curve is the expected demand he faces when he sends a
partially-revealing message, D0. For su¢ ciently high prices, neither 
L
1 nor 
H
1 is binding
and therefore S can expand D1 on both sides of x by lowering price. This is no longer
updating proceeds as follows:
Prob(x = z j x 2 fz; 1  zg) = lim
"!0
F (z + ")  F (z)
F (z + ")  F (z) + F (1  z)  F (1  z   ") :
Using lHôpitals rule,
Prob(x = z j x 2 fz; 1  zg) = lim
"!0
f(z + ")
f(z + ") + f(1  z   ") =
f(z)
f(z) + f(1  z) =
1
2
.
14The equilibrium value of p0 for all (x; v; t) can be found in section A1 of the appendix.
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true for prices for which L1 is binding (this happens for prices below the kink in D1). In
this region, the marginal e¤ect of a price decrease is much smaller under full disclosure
than partial disclosure. For the parameter values in Figure 1, even though p0 < p

1, S
still chooses to send a partially-revealing message because D0   D1 is su¢ ciently large
to ensure a higher revenue.
[Place Figure 1 approximately here]
A comparison of R1 and R0 yields the set of locations that are fully revealed in
equilibrium. This is graphically illustrated in Figure 2 for v = 0:6 and t = 1. The
horizontal axis indicates the value of x. The solid curve is the expected revenue S earns
when x is fully revealed, R1, while the dashed curve is the expected revenue he earns
when he sends a partially-revealing message, R0. As seen in the gure, a set of central
locations (i.e., x 2 [xH ; 1   xH ]) is fully revealed because, as described earlier, S can
achieve a revenue of R1(12 ; v; t) by fully revealing these locations. Focusing on x  12 , as
x gets more distant from 1
2
, L1 becomes binding in case S fully reveals x, so S prefers
sending a partially-revealing message, thereby bringing the perceived variety to 1
2
and
thus expanding demand. The adverse e¤ect of uncertainty is minimal for locations close
to 1
2
but increases quickly as x gets closer to the edges. Therefore, the locations below
xL (symmetrically those above 1  xL) are also fully revealed.
[Place Figure 2 approximately here]
Recall that for an observed message M and price P , B buys G if and only if her
location is at most
q
v P
t
  V ar [x j x 2 
] units away from E [x j x 2 
]. For a given
value of x, if v
t
is su¢ ciently low (i.e., when v
t
< V ar [x j x 2 
]), D0  0 for any
price, so fully revealing x is optimal. As v
t
increases, S can generate a positive demand
by sending a partially-revealing message for low enough prices. Moreover, a higher v
t
lowers the negative e¤ect of a marginal increase in price on D0 by reducing the adverse
e¤ect of uncertainty (since the e¤ect of V ar [x j x 2 
] vanishes as v
t
becomes large).
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As a result, a higher v
t
makes it more likely that S sends a partially-revealing message,
thereby bringing the perceived variety to 1
2
. When v
t
is su¢ ciently high, S fully reveals
only the most central variety x = 1
2
.
Holding v constant, for lower (higher) values of t, both curves in Figure 2 shift upwards
(downwards). The magnitude of the shift is higher for R0 compared to R1. Therefore, the
set of fully revealed locations shrinks (grows). In other words, xH increases (decreases)
while xL decreases (increases) as vt becomes higher. When
v
t
is below a certain threshold
(approximately 0:521), S fully reveals all values of x. When it is su¢ ciently high (higher
than 0:75), S fully reveals only x = 1
2
, while sending a partially-revealing message for the
remaining locations.
Would B reveal her ideal taste if she had such an opportunity? The answer is no
since, as discussed in the preceding subsection, S would fully extract Bs surplus if he
knew . By keeping it as private information, on the other hand, certain types of B
will surely enjoy a strictly positive expected utility while no type of B will ever end up
with a negative utility. Thus, it is Bs private information about her ideal taste that is
responsible for any partial information disclosure that may arise in equilibrium.
3.3 Other PBE and equilibrium selection
The model presented in section 2 allows for other PBE. An example is a fully revealing
one. A belief structure that supports this particular PBE can be described as follows:
in case S sends an o¤-equilibrium message, B puts probability 1 on the location that is
most distant from 1
2
, and if there are two such locations, then she puts probability 1 on
the one on the left (or right).
It is well understood for models of costless information disclosure that equilibrium
renements such as Intuitive Criterionor Universal Divinityhave no bite in selecting
equilibria. This applies to the current model as well. Therefore, I turn attention to a more
recent renement introduced by Mailath et al. [1993], called Undefeated Equilibria.
According to this renement, an equilibrium is defeated if it fails the following test.
Consider a proposed equilibrium and take a message that is o¤ the equilibrium path. If
there is an alternative equilibrium in which this message is on the equilibrium path for a
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non-empty set of types and it is precisely these types that obtain higher payo¤s (strictly
higher for at least one type) in the alternative equilibrium, then the test requires that
the beliefs in the former equilibrium follow Bayesrule for this set of types. Applying
this renement to the current model leads to the following result.
Proposition 3 The (class of) PBE described in Proposition 2 is the only undefeated
(class of) PBE.
Proof. See section A2 of the appendix.
To give a sense of the proof, compare the PBE described in Proposition 2 with a
fully revealing PBE. Consider the message M = fz; 1   zg which is an o¤-equilibrium
message for the fully revealing PBE. Suppose the parameter values are such that this is
an on-equilibrium message for the PBE described in Proposition 2. Then, types z and
1   z must be earning a strictly higher revenue by sending M = fz; 1   zg rather than
fully revealing themselves. It thus follows that the fully-revealing PBE is defeated by the
PBE described in Proposition 2 because beliefs in the former do not put probability 1
2
on each location, but instead put probability 1 on x = z. A similar reasoning applies to
all other PBE. Therefore, the class of PBE described in Proposition 2 arises as the only
undefeated PBE.
4 Social Planners Problem
In this section, I analyze the social welfare properties of equilibrium information disclo-
sure. I focus attention on policies in which a social planner may mandate S to fully reveal
a given set of locations.15 When full disclosure is not mandatory for a particular location
x, S may choose to fully reveal it or send a partially-revealing message as described in
the previous section (i.e., pool it with 1   x). Thus, if the total expected welfare (Ss
revenue plus Bs net utility) evaluated under full disclosure is higher than the expected
welfare evaluated under a partially-revealing message for a particular location x, then
the social planner mandates S to fully reveal it (unless S voluntarily does so).
15The rst-best is to set the price equal to the marginal cost of production (which is 0) and force S to
fully reveal the variety at all times.
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Even though the classical information disclosure literature typically nds excessive
information disclosure, this nding critically depends on the assumption that consumers
have unit demands with identical reservations prices. In this case, since disclosure does
not change the equilibrium quantity purchased, it is purely redistributive. In the current
model, on the other hand, the expected demand S faces is downward-sloping. Although
S charges a higher price under full location information, B makes a better-informed
decision. So, while it is clear that Ss expected revenue goes down by mandating him to
fully reveal a location which he would normally not reveal, Bs net expected utility may
increase. Therefore, it is a priori unclear whether there is any need for intervention.16
Denote the expected consumer surplus as CSi and the total expected welfare as Wi,
where i = 1 if S sends a fully revealing message and i = 0 if S sends a partially-revealing
message. When x is fully revealed, S chooses a price p1 and B buys G if her location is at
most
q
v p1
t
units away from x (in other words, if  2 L1 ; H1 ). Thus, for a particular
value of x,
CS1(x; v; t) =
H1 (p1;x;v;t)Z
L1 (p1;x;v;t)
(v   p1(x; v; t)  t(  x)2)d, (4)
W1(x; v; t) = R1(x; v; t) + CS1(x; v; t). (5)
Similarly, when S sends a partially-revealing message, he chooses a price p0 and B
buys G if her location is at most
q
v p0
t
   1
2
  x2 units away from 1
2
. Thus,
CS0(x; v; t) =
H0 (p0;x;v;t)Z
L0 (p0;x;v;t)
 
v   p0(x; v; t)  t(  x)2

d (6)
W0(x; v; t) = R0(x; v; t) + CS0(x; v; t). (7)
Alternatively, consumer surplus can conveniently be expressed as the area under the
corresponding demand curve and above the equilibrium price.17
CS1(x; v; t) =
vZ
p1(x;v;t)
D1(P ;x; v; t)dP ,
16If disclosure is su¢ ciently costly, a monopoly seller may under-provide full quality information when
demand is downward-sloping. See Daughety and Reinganum [2008] and Celik [2011] for further details.
17See section A3 of the appendix for a formal derivation.
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CS0(x; v; t) =
v t( 1
2
 x)2Z
p0(x;v;t)
D0(P ;x; v; t)dP:
Given the set of policies available to the social planner and the welfare denitions
given in equations (5) and (7), the social planner mandates S to fully reveal a particular
variety x if W1(x; v; t) > W0(x; v; t) whereas R1(x; v; t) < R0(x; v; t) (so that S normally
sends a partially-revealing message). Proposition 4 establishes that there is actually no
variety x for which this is true.
Proposition 4 Mandating S to fully reveal a location does not improve social welfare,
while it is often socially harmful.
Proof. See section A2 of the appendix.
For B, there are two opposing consumer surplus e¤ects of partial disclosure. Both of
these e¤ects can be seen in Figure 1. On the one hand, being partially informed about
the variety, Bs expected match with G is reduced compared to full information, which
leads to a decrease in consumer surplus. This is the area above p1 and between the two
demand curves in Figure 1. On the other hand, for varieties that are close to 0 or 1, S
can expand the expected demand by sending a partially-revealing message, in particular
for low prices (this is because L1 or 
H
1 becomes binding for prices below a threshold,
so the rate at which S can expand D1 by lowering price goes down). In such a case, S
charges a lower price, which leads to a higher demand and a higher consumer surplus.
This is the area between the two prices, p0 and p

1, and to the left of D0. It is the
magnitude of these two e¤ects that determines if partial disclosure improves welfare. I
show in the proof of Proposition 4 that the second e¤ect is always larger than the rst one
in situations in which S normally sends a partially-revealing message (i.e., CS0 > CS1
whenever R0 > R1), so mandating S to fully reveal x harms S. In other words, the
demand enlargement e¤ect of disclosing partial information is large enough to o¤set the
loss due to potential mismatch.18
18Under partial disclosure, some buyer types incur very high transportation costs ex post, while some
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5 Discussion
In this section, I discuss several points related to possible extensions of the model. The
rst point regards incorporating uncertainty about quality. As noted before, the parame-
ter v can be interpreted as the quality of the good. If the buyer is also uncertain about
the quality, it can easily be shown that the sellers expected revenue is strictly increasing
in the perceived quality of the buyer. This is true even when the seller is assumed to be
uncertain about the buyers taste for quality.19 Thus, regardless of her prior beliefs for
it, quality would be fully revealed in every PBE. In other words, the usual unraveling
story applies with respect to quality disclosure. Accordingly, all of the main results about
location disclosure remain valid.
Second, I have considered a general message technology whereby the seller could send
any message that includes the true location of the good. If the seller is somehow con-
strained to either fully reveal the location or stay silent, then the structure of equilibrium
information disclosure substantially changes. When the buyers preference for her ideal
taste is su¢ ciently strong, the seller fully reveals all locations. When it is weak, the
seller fully reveals a set of central locations while staying silent for the remaining ones.
Depending on the shape of the buyers prior beliefs, there may be multiple PBE. In this
case, each PBE is characterized with a di¤erent set of fully revealed locations. The set of
fully revealed locations shrinks in every PBE as the buyers preference for her ideal taste
becomes weaker, but is always non-empty. Sun [2011] analyzes this problem when the
buyers disutility due to a mismatch increases linearly with the value of the mismatch
(i.e., when the transportation cost function is linear). Her ndings are very similar with
one major di¤erence. She nds that the seller stays silent for all locations if the buyers
preference for her ideal variety is su¢ ciently strong.
turn lucky. In section A3 of the appendix, I show that
H0Z
L0
(  x)2 d =
H0Z
L0
1
2
 
(  x)2 + t(1  x  )2 d,
so, on average, these e¤ects even out.
19Consider the utility function v   p   t(   x)2, where  > 0. Here,  measures the buyers taste
for quality. It is easy to show that the sellers expected revenue is strictly increasing in the perceived
quality when the seller is uncertain about  and  while the buyer is uncertain about v and x.
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The third point is about the shape of the transportation cost function. The class
of PBE described in Proposition 2 remains valid for any strictly convex transportation
function. When the transportation function is linear as in Sun [2011], although the PBE
described in Proposition 2 is still valid, there are many other PBE which are payo¤-
equivalent for the seller, but are substantially di¤erent in terms of the buyers equilibrium
inferences. To see this, suppose that v
t
is large enough so that all types of the buyer
are served in equilibrium. In this case, the seller optimally charges a price equal to
v   t
2
(the price that leaves the buyer types  = 0; 1 indi¤erent between buying and
not), but otherwise is indi¤erent between sending any (truthful) message that leads
to a perceived location of 1
2
. One example is M = fx; 1  xg for each x as in the
current paper, while another example isM = [0; 1] for all varieties, which is equivalent to
staying fully silent. The inferences in these two examples are quite di¤erent. While the
PBE described in Proposition 2 is still valid with a linear transportation function, the
welfare results may change. The seller is able to capture a much higher portion of the
buyers surplus by sending a partially-revealing message since the buyer is more neutral
to uncertainty. Therefore, in situations in which the seller only slightly prefers sending a
partially-revealing message to fully revealing x, it may be welfare enhancing to mandate
the seller to fully reveal x.20
The fourth point is related to the assumption of costless information disclosure. If
disclosure is costly, on the contrary, then the seller may prefer staying silent when the
location is close to the edges. However, provided that it is not too costly, the structure
of information disclosure stays the same for more central locations. If it is too costly, the
seller stays silent for all locations. In this case, it may be socially benecial to mandate
the seller to fully reveal a set of central locations. See Daughety and Reinganum [2008]
and Celik [2011] for a similar result in a quality-disclosure framework when the seller
faces a downward-sloping demand.
20As an example, take x = 0. If the seller sends M = f0; 1g, he chooses p0 = v   t2 and the resulting
revenue is R0 = p0. If he fully reveals x, then the demand he faces is D1 (P ) = v Pt , so the optimal
price is p1 = v2 and the resulting revenue is R1 =
v2
4t . When
v
t = 2  
p
2, it is easy to verify that
R0 = R1. However, CS0 = 0 because all buyer types have the same willingness-to-pay when the seller
sends M = f0; 1g, while CS1 > 0 because the buyer types  < v p1t enjoy a strictly positive surplus
when x = 0 is fully revealed. Therefore, for vt slightly above 2  
p
2, it is better to mandate the seller
to fully reveal x = 0.
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A nal point is about the prior beliefs of the buyer about the location of the good.
Even though I have assumed that the prior beliefs are symmetric around 1
2
, the class
of PBE described in Proposition 2 is valid for any prior beliefs. Consider the following
o¤-equilibrium beliefs. When the seller includes many locations in his message, the buyer
associates the good with the location that is farthest away from 1
2
. In case there are two
such locations, the buyer assigns a positive probability to both.21 Under these beliefs,
the seller never sends a message that includes locations farther away from the center than
the goods true location. Therefore, the class of PBE described in Proposition 2 remains
valid. However, it is generally not the unique PBE. Unless f(x) is symmetric around
1
2
, sending a partially-revealing message as described in Proposition 2 does not lead to
a perceived location of 1
2
. Therefore, the seller may choose a message that brings the
perceived location closer to 1
2
unless the adverse e¤ect of uncertainty is too high.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, I analyze the level of information a privately-informed monopoly seller
voluntarily reveals about the horizontal attribute of the good he sells. The horizontal
attribute is captured by a location over the unit line. I consider a single buyer with a
privately known ideal taste which is also captured by a location (although the ndings
would be the same if there is a continuum of buyers with di¤erent ideal tastes). Although
information unraveling does not apply to the fullest extent, it is still at work. I show
that there is a unique class of undefeated PBE in which the degree of mismatch between
the true location of the good and the expected ideal taste of the buyer fully unravels.
The driving force for this nding is the (optimal) skepticism of the buyer; any partially-
revealing message induces her to believe that the true location of the good is the one in
the message that is farthest away from her expected ideal taste. The seller fully reveals
the true location only when the buyers preference for her ideal taste is su¢ ciently strong.
As it becomes weaker, the set of fully revealed locations monotonically shrinks and when
21There is an exception for messages such that M  p v3t ; 1 p v3t. These are the locations for
which the seller earns a revenue of R1
 
1
2 ; v; t

. In this case, assume the buyer believes the message as
it is. Since such an inference introduces a positive variance, the seller would never deviate from fully
revealing x  p v3t ; 1 p v3t.
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it is su¢ ciently weak, the seller fully reveals only the location that corresponds to the
expected ideal taste of the buyer.
From a social point of view, I nd that it is never welfare-improving, but is often
socially harmful, to mandate the seller to fully reveal a location that he voluntarily does
not. The reason for this nding is the demand enlargement e¤ect of a partially-revealing
message whereby the seller typically charges a lower price compared to what he would
charge under full disclosure. This is in line with the classical information disclosure
literature which also nds excessive disclosure.
I have assumed that horizontal attributes of a good can be described by a single
location. Future work may consider multiple horizontal and vertical attributes and ana-
lyze the incentives of a monopoly seller to provide information on multiple dimensions.
Moreover, such an extension would enable an empirical test of the model. An example
is the market for real estate where there is typically a limited number of characteristics
sellers may reveal in advertisements.
Appendix
A1 Equilibrium price
In this section of the appendix, I derive the equilibrium price S chooses under the two
possible scenarios: when S fully reveals x and when he sends a partially-revealing message.
This will later be helpful in the proofs of propositions. Note that since Ss beliefs for 
are uniform over [0; 1], the probability B buys G at a given price is symmetric around
1
2
with respect to x. So, it will be su¢ cient to characterize equilibrium price for x  1
2
only.
Case 1 When S fully reveals x
Since Ss beliefs for  are uniform over [0; 1], the probability B buys G at some given
price is symmetric around 1
2
with respect to x. So, it will be su¢ cient to characterize
equilibrium price for x  1
2
only. By equations (2) and (3), for a given (P; v; t), if S
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chooses a price such that v P
t
< 1
4
, then
D1(P ;x; v; t) =
8<: x+
q
v P
t
, x <
q
v P
t
2
q
v P
t
,
q
v P
t
 x  1
2
:
If, on the other hand, 1
4
 v P
t
< 1, then
D1(P ;x; v; t) =
8<: x+
q
v P
t
, x < 1 
q
v P
t
1 , 1 
q
v P
t
 x  1
2
.
Finally, when v P
t
 1, all types of B buy G, so D1(P ;x; v; t) = 1. Maximization of
P

x+
q
v P
t

with respect to P leads to a price of 2t
9

3v
t
  x2 + x
q
3v
t
+ x2

, while
the same for 2P
q
v P
t
leads to a price of 2v
3
. Checking for corner solutions leads to the
following equilibrium price (tedious but otherwise straightforward algebra).
 If v
t
< 3
4
,
p1(x; v; t) =
8><>:
2t
9

3v
t
  x2 + x
q
3v
t
+ x2

, x <
p
v
5t
t
 
v
t
  x2 , p v
5t
 x <p v
3t
2v
3
,
p
v
3t
 x  1
2
.
 3
4
 v
t
< 5
4
,
p1(x; v; t) =
(
2t
9

3v
t
  x2 + x
q
3v
t
+ x2

, x <
p
v
5t
t
 
v
t
  x2 , p v
5t
 x  1
2
.
 If 5
4
 v
t
< 3,
p1(x; v; t) =
(
2t
9

3v
t
  x2 + x
q
3v
t
+ x2

, x < 2 p1 + v
t
t
 
v
t
  (1  x)2 , 2 p1 + v
t
 x  1
2
.
 If v
t
 3,
p1(x; v; t) = t
v
t
  (1  x)2

for all x  1
2
.
Note that p1 is non-monotonic in x (as x goes from 0 to 12). For
v
t
< 5
4
, when x is
su¢ ciently close to 0, S prefers to keep the price low in order to increase the probability
of a purchase, thereby leaving a positive surplus to the  = 0 type B. So, in this region,
S e¤ectively chooses the highest type of B that he wants to serve. Therefore, as x gets
25
closer to 1
2
, the price S optimally sets increases. When
p
v
5t
 x  minp v
3t
; 1
2
	
, it
becomes optimal to make  = 0 type B indi¤erent between buying and not. Therefore,
the equilibrium price is decreasing in this region. When v
t
 5
4
on the other hand, the
real question S faces is whether to sell or not to the  = 1 type B. This particular type
is willing to pay more for values of x closer to 1. Therefore, the equilibrium price is
increasing over x 2 0; 1
2

when v
t
is large.
Case 2 When S sends a partially-revealing message
When S sends a partially-revealing message, say M = [x; 1   x], B infers that the true
variety must be either x or 1   x. Hence, when S charges a price P , equations (2) and
(3) reduce to
L0 = max
8<:0; 12  
s
v   P
t
 

1
2
  x
29=; ,
H0 = min
8<:1; 12 +
s
v   P
t
 

1
2
  x
29=; .
For a given (P; v; t), if S chooses a price such that v P
t
< 1
4
,
D0(P ;x; v; t) =
8<: 0 , x <
1
2
 
q
v P
t
2
q
v P
t
   1
2
  x2 , 1
2
 
q
v P
t
 x  1
2
.
Similarly, if 1
4
 v P
t
< 3
4
,
D0(P ;x; v; t) =
8<: 2
q
v P
t
   1
2
  x2 , x < 1
2
 
q
v P
t
  1
4
1 , 1
2
 
q
v P
t
  1
4
 x  1
2
.
Finally, when v P
t
 3
4
, all types of B buy G, so D0(P ;x; v; t) = 1. Maximizing
PD0(P ;x; v; t), with respect to P leads to the following equilibrium price (when the
expected demand equals 0 for any P  0, I assume that the equilibrium price is 0).
 If v
t
< 1
4
,
p0(x; v; t) =
(
0 , x < 1
2
 pv
t
2t

v
t
 ( 12 x)
2

3
, 1
2
 pv
t
 x  1
2
.
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 If 1
4
 v
t
< 3
4
,
p0(x; v; t) =
2t

v
t
   1
2
  x2
3
, for all x  1
2
.
 If 3
4
 v
t
< 1,
p0(x; v; t) =
8><>:
2t

v
t
 ( 12 x)
2

3
, x < 1
2
 
q
v
t
  3
4
t

v
t
   1
2
  x2   1
4

, 1
2
 
q
v
t
  3
4
 x  1
2
.
 If v
t
 1,
p0(x; v; t) = t
 
v
t
 

1
2
  x
2
  1
4
!
, for all x  1
2
.
In this scenario, when v
t
is small, S cannot generate any demand for G unless it is
located su¢ ciently close to 1
2
. So, in this case, the choice of price is random. I assume,
for simplicity, that S charges a price of 0 in such a case. In all other cases, p0 is strictly
positive and it strictly increases as x gets closer to 1
2
. When v
t
su¢ ciently large, S serves
all types of B, so in this case, the equilibrium price is the one that leaves zero surplus to
 = 0 (or, equivalently,  = 1) type B.
A2 Proofs of the Propositions
In this section, I present the proofs of the propositions stated in the main text. Since
the prior beliefs for x are symmetric around 1
2
, I will consider only the values of x over
0; 1
2

unless otherwise noted.
Proof of Proposition 1. Using Envelope Theorem, over the values of x for which
p1 =
2t
9

3v
t
  x2 + x
q
3v
t
+ x2

, we have dR1
dx
= P @D1(P ;x;v;t)
@x
evaluated at P = p1. In this
range, D1 = x+
q
v P
t
, so @D1
@x
= 1. Since p1 > 0, it follows that dR1dx = p1 > 0 for these
values of x. For the values of x for which  = 0 or  = 1 type B is made indi¤erent between
buying and not, Envelope Theorem is not applicable (because it is a corner solution).
When v
t
< 5
4
, this happens for
p
v
5t
 x < minp v
3t
; 1
2
	
in which case S charges a
price p1 = t
 
v
t
  x2 and faces an expected demand D1 = x +qv Pt = 2x. So, the
equilibrium revenue is simply R1 = 2t
 
v
t
  x2 x, which is strictly increasing in x for all
x < min
p
v
3t
; 1
2
	
. Similarly, when v
t
 5
4
, it happens for max

0; 2 p1 + v
t
	  x  1
2
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in which case S charges a price p1 = t
 
v
t
  (1  x)2 and serves all types of B (since
x+
q
v P
t
= 1), so R1 = t
 
v
t
  (1  x)2. This is again strictly increasing in x. Finally,
when v
t
< 3
4
, S charges a price p1 = 2v3 for
p
v
3t
 x  1
2
and faces an expected demand
D1 = 2
q
v P
t
= 2
p
v
3t
. The revenue R1 = 4v3
p
v
3t
is constant for these values of x.
Proof of Proposition 2. I start with showing that there exists a PBE in which the
value of
1
2
  x fully unravels. I then proceed with showing that the set of fully revealed
locations shrinks as v
t
is higher. To make the latter easier, I present two lemmas below.
Finally, I argue that there are values of v
t
for which R0 < R1 for all x and for which
R0 > R1 for all x. This concludes the proof.
Before proceeding, it is useful to make the following two important observations.
First, if two messages lead to the same perceived variety, S strictly prefers the message
associated with a lower implied variance. Formally, suppose there are two messages M
and M 0 such that E [x j x 2 
] = E [x j x 2 
0] and V ar [x j x 2 
] < V ar [x j x 2 
0].
Then, M leads to a strictly higher expected revenue than M 0. Second, o¤-equilibrium
beliefs cannot be randomly chosen in veriable disclosure games. After observing an
o¤-equilibrium message M , B will not assign a positive probability to any x 62 M . For
example, if S unexpectedly fully reveals x, then B believes S because lying is ruled out.
First, suppose v
t
< 3
4
so that the region
p
v
3t
 x  1   p v
3t
is non-empty. By
Proposition 1, this is where the expected revenue S earns is constant and is equal to
R1
 
1
2
; v; t

. The locations in this region must be fully revealed in every PBE because
any partially-revealing PBE implies a positive variance, V ar [x j x 2 
] > 0, and S can
protably deviate by fully revealing x thereby achieving R1(x; v; t) = R1
 
1
2
; v; t

. For
x <
p
v
3t
, by Proposition 1, R1(x; v; t) is strictly increasing in x. Given that S fully
reveals all x 2 p v
3t
; 1 p v
3t

, then it is best for S to either fully reveal x or reveal1
2
  x, say by sendingM = [x; 1 x], for all x <p v
3t
(symmetrically, for x > 1 p v
3t
).
The latter strategy is associated with the lowest variance among all possible inferences
S may induce B to make. This is because pooling with locations that are farther away
from 1
2
than the true location simply raises V ar [x j x 2 
]. An example of supporting o¤-
equilibrium beliefs are as follows: after observing a partially-revealing message, B assigns
a probability of 1 to the location that is farthest away from 1
2
(in case there are two such
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locations, assume that B assigns full probability to the location on the left). Note that
under these beliefs, S is indi¤erent between sending any message M  p v
3t
; 1 p v
3t

for
p
v
3t
 x  1   p v
3t
because any such message leads to an expected revenue of
R1
 
1
2
; v; t

. However, by the tie-breaking rule that S chooses the most precise message
in case of indi¤erence, he fully reveals all of these locations.
When v
t
 3
4
, R1(x; v; t) is strictly increasing in x for all x  12 . Again, given that
S fully reveals x = 1
2
in every PBE, it is best for S to either fully reveal x or reveal1
2
  x, say by sending M = [x; 1   x], for all x 6= 1
2
. Hence, when S sends a message
M = [x; 1   x], B optimally assigns a positive probability to both x and 1   x. This
completes the rst part of the proof.
Next, I show that the set of fully revealed locations shrinks as v
t
becomes higher. This
is substantially eased by the following two lemmas. The rst one establishes that, under
both strategies S may choose (i.e., either fully reveal x or reveal
1
2
  x), the derivative of
equilibrium revenue divided by t with respect to v
t
is equal to the corresponding expected
demand. The second lemma shows that whenever a partially-revealing message is more
protable than fully revealing x, the expected demand under the former is at least as
large as the one under the latter. Before proceeding with the lemmas, note from equations
(2) and (3) that, under both strategies, price enters the expected demand function as P
t
.
Moreover, the equilibrium prices I nd in section A1 are multiples of t. Thus, both pj
t
and Rj
t
(j = 0; 1) are functions of only x and v
t
.
Lemma 1 d(R1=t)
d(v=t)
= D1(p1; x; v; t) and
d(R0=t)
d(v=t)
= D0(p0; x; v; t) for all x.
Proof of Lemma 1. I start with the case when S fully reveals x. First, take the
values of x and v
t
for which p1
t
= 2
9

3v
t
  x2 + x
q
3v
t
+ x2

. In this region, D1 = x +q
v P
t
. By the Envelope Theorem, d(R1=t)
d(v=t)
= P
t
@D1
@(v=t)
evaluated at P = p1. Since @D1@(v=t) =
  @D1
@(P=t)
, and the revenue maximization problem implies D1 + Pt
@D1
@(P=t)
= 0 evaluated at
P = p1, we have
d(R1=t)
d(v=t)
= D1. When vt <
5
4
, for
p
v
5t
 x  minp v
3t
; 1
2
	
, S charges
a price p1 = t
 
v
t
  x2 and faces an expected demand D1 = x + qv Pt = 2x. The
equilibrium revenue is simply R1 = 2t
 
v
t
  x2 x, and thus, d(R1=t)
d(v=t)
= 2x, which equals the
equilibrium expected demand. Similarly, when v
t
 5
4
, for max

0; 2 p1 + v
t
	
< x  1
2
,
S charges a price p1 = t
 
v
t
  (1  x)2 and serves all types of B, so R1 = t  vt   (1  x)2.
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Again, d(R1=t)
d(v=t)
= 1 which equals the equilibrium expected demand. Finally, when v
t
< 3
4
,
for
p
v
3t
 x  1
2
, S charges a price p1 = 2v3 and faces an expected demand D1 =
2
q
v P
t
= 2
p
v
3t
. Hence, R1
t
= 4
 
v
3t
3=2
, and thus, d(R1=t)
d(v=t)
= 2
p
v
3t
which, again, equals
the equilibrium expected demand.
When S sends a partially-revealing message, there are three prices depending on x
that he can possibly charge, as given in section A1. When x < 1
2
 pv
t
, the expected
demand equals 0 for all values of the price, so the result is trivial for this case. In the
range where p0 =
2t

v
t
 ( 12 x)
2

3
, the expected demand is D0 = 2
q
v P
t
   1
2
  x2. By
Envelope Theorem, d(R0=t)
d(v=t)
= P
t
@D0
@(v=t)
evaluated at P = p0. Since @D0@(v=t) =   @D0@(P=t) , and
the revenue maximization problem implies D0 + Pt
@D0
@(P=t)
= 0 evaluated at P = p0, we
have d(R0=t)
d(v=t)
= D0. Finally, in the range where p0 = t

v
t
   1
2
  x2   1
4

, the expected
demand is D0 = 1. Hence, R0t =
p0
t
, and thus, d(R0=t)
d(v=t)
= 1 = D0.
Lemma 2 If R0  R1 for some x, then D0  D1 for the same x.
Proof of Lemma 2. When x = 1
2
, two regimes are equivalent, so the following
analysis applies to x < 1
2
. If R0  R1 for some x at which D0 = 1, the result is trivial.
From section A1, this happens for 1
2
 
q
v
t
  3
4
 x  1
2
when 3
4
 v
t
< 1, and for all x
when v
t
 1. For values of x for which p0 = 0 or for which p1 = 2v3 , it is always true that
R0 < R1, so, again, the result is trivial. For the remaining congurations, it is enough to
simply compare the equilibrium values of p0 and p1 for the same x. When x <
p
v
5t
, for
all x in the range,
p1 =
2t
9
 
3v
t
  x2 + x
r
3v
t
+ x2
!
 2v
3
>
2t

v
t
   1
2
  x2
3
= p0.
When
p
v
5t
 x < minp v
3t
; 1
2
	
,
p1
r
v
3t
; v; t

=
2v
3
>
2t

v
t
   1
2
 p v
3t
2
3
= p0
r
v
3t
; v; t

.
Since p1 is decreasing and p0 is increasing in x in this range, it follows that p1 > p0 for
all x here, too. Hence, if R0  R1 for some x < min
p
v
3t
; 1
2
	
, then it must be that
D0  D1 for the same x.
Finally, I argue that there are values of v
t
for which R0 < R1 for all x and for which
R0 > R1 for all x (except for x = 12 where R0 = R1). Together with the two lemmas,
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this concludes the proof. Note that R0 < R1 for all x 
p
v
3t
(since R1 = R1
 
1
2
; v; t

in this region) and for all x  1
2
 pv
t
(since R0 = 0 in this region).
p
v
3t
= 1
2
 pv
t
when v
t
= 3
8(2+
p
3)
. Thus, when v
t
 3
8(2+
p
3)
, R0 < R1 for all x. Similarly, when
v
t
is su¢ ciently high, R0 > R1 for all x. For instance, when vt > 3, from section A1,
R0 = t

v
t
   1
2
  x2   1
4

and R1 = t
 
v
t
  (1  x)2. A comparison yields that R0 > R1
when 1
2
  x > 0, which is true for all x < 1
2
.22 Thus, for each value of x, there is a value
of v
t
such that R0 > R1. Then, by Lemmas 1 and 2, if R0 > R1 at some x, then R0 > R1
at the same value of x for all higher values of v
t
.
Proof of Proposition 3. I rst provide a formal denition of defeated equilibrium. I
then provide an algorithm that establishes that the class of PBE described in Proposition
2 defeats any other class of PBE. I nally show that there exists no other PBE that defeats
the class of PBE described in Proposition 2, so this class is the unique undefeated PBE.
For the remainder of the proof, I restrict on-the-equilibrium-path messages to perfectly
overlap with the inferences; i.e., m (x)  
 (m (x)). This is without any loss of generality
because it is the equilibrium inferences that distinguishes two PBEs from each other,
while there are typically innitely many messages that lead to the same inferences.
Denition Denote R (; x) as the revenue S earns for variety x in PBE . Then,
  (b; p;m; ) defeats 0  (b0; p0;m0; 0) if there exists M  [0; 1] such that
(i) No type in 0 sends M , while the set of types in  that send M is non-empty, i.e.,
8x 2 [0; 1], m0(x) 6=M , and T = fx 2 [0; 1] j m(x) =Mg 6= ?;
(ii) All types that send M in  earn higher payo¤s (strictly higher for at least one) in
 than 0; i.e., 8x 2 T , R (; x)  R (0; x) and T s = fx 2 T j R (; x) > R (0; x)g 6= ?;
(iii) Beliefs in 0 are inconsistent for x 2 T s in the following sense: 9x 2 T for
which 0 (x jM) 6= f(x)(x)R
~x2T
(~x)f(~x)d~x
for any  : T ! [0; 1] satisfying  (~x) = 1 if ~x 2 T s and
 (~x) = 0 if ~x 62 T (thus allowing for types that are indi¤erent to randomize).
Let the PBE described in Proposition 2 be denoted as  and take some other PBE
0. It can be established by following the algorithm below that  defeats 0.
22In fact, it can be shown that R0 < R1 for all x when vt . 0:521 and R0 > R1 for all x when
v
t  0:75. However, the derivation is long and tedious, but otherwise straightforward algebra. Since it
is not important for the results, I skip it here. It is available upon request.
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(1) Locate a variety x for which m (x) 6= m0 (x).
(2) Denote the variety in m0 (x) that is closest to 1
2
as x1 (pick randomly if there are
two such varieties).
(3) Check if R (0; 1  x1)  R (0; x1) or not. If this holds, then it must be that
both x = x1 and x = 1   x1 do strictly better in  than in 0. So, beliefs in 0 are
inconsistent.23
(4) If R (0; 1  x1) > R (0; x1), then m0 (1  x1) must involve at least one variety
that is closer to 1
2
than x1. Locate the variety in m0 (1  x1) that is closest to 12 (pick
randomly of there are two such varieties) and denote it as x2.
(5) Repeat steps 3 and 4 until you nd a variety xn for which R (0; 1  xn) 
R (0; xn). Such a variety must exist because R (0; 1  x) = R (0; x) for x = 12 .
It is helpful to articulate a bit more on the algorithm. First, suppose that x1 is the
only location in m0 (x), so R (0; x1) = R1 (x1). Then, by the assertion in step 1, it must
be that m (x1) = fx1; 1  x1g, and by the denition of ,
R (; x1) = R (; 1  x1) = R0 (x1) > R1 (x1) .
Assuming R (0; 1  x1)  R (0; x1), it follows that
R (0; 1  x1)  R (0; x1) = R1 (x1) < R (; x1) = R (; 1  x1) .
This means that upon observing a message m = fx1; 1  x1g, beliefs in 0 should assign
a probability of 1
2
to both x = x1 and x = 1   x1. However, in such a case, S would
deviate from 0 and instead send m = fx1; 1  x1g for both x = x1 and x = 1 x1. Thus,
 defeats 0.
Next, suppose that m0 (x1) = m0 (1  x1) = fx1; 1  x1g, so beliefs in 0 assign equal
probability to x = x1 and x = 1   x1 upon observing this message. Due to the tie-
breaking condition, this means that R1 (x1) < R0 (x1). However, by step 1, it must be
23This step is satised for any symmetric PBE for which R (; x) = R (; 1  x) for all x 2 [0; 1].
In principle, there may exist asymmetric PBE, too. As an example, suppose f () is uniform and vt is
large enough. Then the following is a PBE: all x except for x = 0:4 and x = 0:59 are fully revealed
while S sends m = f0:4; 0:59g for x = 0:4 and 0:59. Possible beliefs that support this PBE involve
taking the message m = f0:4; 0:59g literally, so assigning Pr (x = 0:4) = Pr (x = 0:59) = 0:5 after seeing
m = f0:4; 0:59g, and assigning probability one to the variety that is farthest away from 12 (on the one on
the left if there are two such varieties) for any other message. The forth and fth steps of the algorithm
apply only for asymmetric PBE.
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that m (x1) = x1, which means R1 (x1)  R0 (x1). Thus, if m (x1) = x1, 0 cannot
involve m0 (x1) = m0 (1  x1) = fx1; 1  x1g.
Finally, suppose that there are at least two distinct asymmetric locations in m0 (x).
Denote the variety in m0 (x) that is closest to 1
2
as x1 and assume that R (0; 1  x1) 
R (0; x1). By the asymmetry of m0 (x), it must be that
R0 (x1) > R (
0; x1) = R (0; x) .
In other words, S would have strictly preferred sending m = fx1; 1  x1g if B assigned
a probability of 1
2
to both x = x1 and x = 1   x1 upon observing this message. Now,
suppose m (x1) = fx1; 1  x1g in . Then, beliefs in 0 must be inconsistent because
otherwise S would deviate from 0 by sending m = fx1; 1  x1g for both x1 and 1   x1,
and earn a higher payo¤. If S fully reveals x1 in , i.e., if m (x1) = x1, then by the
construction of ,
R1 (x1)  R0 (x1) ,
so it follows that
R1 (x1)  R0 (x1) > R (0; x1) .
In such a case, S would again deviate from 0 by sending m = x1 for x = x1, so beliefs in
0 are inconsistent.
It is possible that 0 is asymmetric and that R (0; 1  x1) > R (0; x1). Then, as
stated in step 4, m0 (1  x1) must involve at least one variety that is closer to 12 than
x1 because otherwise R (0; 1  x1) could not be strictly larger than R (0; x1). Denoting
the variety in m0 (1  x1) that is closest to 12 as x2, one can proceed as in the previous
paragraph. If it is again the case that R (0; 1  x2) > R (0; x2), the algorithm calls
for repeating the same process until a variety xn is located for which R (0; 1  xn) 
R (0; xn). Since the algorithm alternates between the two sides of 12 and gets strictly
closer to 1
2
at each new iteration, such a critical variety xn 6= 12 exists.
As the nal step of the proof, I show that there are no other PBE that defeat the
class of PBE described in Proposition 2. The approach is very similar to the rst part of
the proof, so I will be more brief. Suppose, on the contrary, that there is another PBE
0 that defeats . Then, there exists at least one message M such that no type in 
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sends M while the set of types in 0 that send M is non-empty, and all types that send
M in 0 earn higher payo¤s (strictly higher for at least one type) in 0 than . By this
latter observation, we can immediately rule out the scenarios in which only one type in
0 sends M and in which only two types in 0 that are equally distanced from 1
2
send
M . Hence, there must be at least two asymmetric types in 0 that send M . Denote the
variety in M that is closest to 1
2
as x1 (pick randomly if there are two such varieties).
If all variaties in M are on either the left-hand side or the right-hand side of 1
2
, then it
is obvious that type x1 would be strictly better o¤ by sending a fully revealing message
and earning R1 (x1). By the construction of , we know that R (; x1)  R1 (x1), so
it cannot be true that all types that send M in 0 earn higher payo¤s in 0 than .
Similarly, if there are some variaties inM that are on the left-hand side of 1
2
and some on
the right-hand side, then type x1 would be strictly better o¤ by sending fx1; 1  x1g and
earning R0 (x1) since this implies a perceived variety 12 and has a strictly lower variance.
Since it must be that R (; x1)  R0 (x1), it again cannot be true that all types that
send M in 0 earn higher payo¤s in 0 than . Hence, we reach a contradiction.
Proof of Proposition 4. From section A1, when v
t
 1, all types of B are served
for any x in case S sends a partially-revealing message, and v   t(   x)2  0 for each
type of B. Thus, when v
t
 1, W0  W1 for all x (with equality when all types of B
are served under full disclosure, too). So, the proof is trivial in this case; mandating full
disclosure brings no extra gain while it may be harmful. Similarly, for parameter values
where the expected demand is zero under the partially-revealing strategy (this happens
for x  1
2
 pv
t
when v
t
 1
4
), full disclosure is welfare superior to sending a partially-
revealing message. However, since S voluntarily reveals all x for these parameter values,
there is no need for mandating full disclosure. For the remainder of the proof, I focus on
the remaining situations (i.e., v
t
< 1 and D0 > 0) and show that CS0 > CS1 whenever
R0 > R1, so the result follows.
Case 1: x <
p
v
5t
In this case, if S sends a partially-revealing message for x, the resulting consumer surplus
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is expressed as
CS0 =
v t( 12 x)
2Z
p0
2
s
v   P
t
 

1
2
  x
2
dP =
4t
3
 
v   p0
t
 

1
2
  x
2!3=2
.
In the region where p0 =
2t

v
t
 ( 12 x)
2

3
, this is equal to CS0 = 4t3

v
t
 ( 12 x)
2
3
3=2
. In the
same region,D0 = 2
q
v p0
t
   1
2
  x2 = 2r vt ( 12 x)2
3
, soR0 = p0D0 = 4t

v
t
 ( 12 x)
2
3
3=2
.
Thus, it follows thatCS0 = 13R0 in this region. In the region where p0 = t

v
t
   1
2
  x2   1
4

,
on the other hand, CS0 = 4t3
 
1
4
3=2
= t
6
.
When S fully reveals x, the resulting consumer surplus is
CS1 =
v tx2Z
p1
 
x+
r
v   P
t
!
dP +
vZ
v tx2
2
r
v   P
t
dP .
Evaluated at x = 0, p1 = 2v3 , and CS1 =
vR
2v=3
q
v P
t
dP = 2t
3
 
v
3t
3=2
. Demand evaluated
at x = 0 is given by D1 =
q
v p1
t
=
p
v
3t
, so R1(0; v; t) = 2t
 
v
3t
3=2
. Thus, it follows that
CS1(0; v; t) =
1
3
R1(0; v; t).
Next, observe that
dCS1(x; v; t)
dx
= (v   tx2   p1) 
 
x+
r
v   p1
t
!
dp1
dx
,
dR1(x; v; t)
dx
= p1,
where the second line follows from the Envelope Theorem. The equilibrium price in this
region can be rewritten as p1 = 2t9
q
3v
t
+ x2 + 2x
q
3v
t
+ x2   x

and the resulting
demand as x+
q
v p1
t
= 1
3
q
3v
t
+ x2 + 2x

. Taking the derivative of p1 with respect to
x and then multiplying the result with the expected demand gives 
x+
r
v   p1
t
!
dp1
dx
=
1
3
0@1  xq
3v
t
+ x2
1A p1.
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Thus,
d
 
CS1   R13

dx
= (v   tx2   p1) 
 
x+
r
v   p1
t
!
dp1
dx
  p1
3
= v   tx2  
0@5
3
  1
3
xq
3v
t
+ x2
1A p1.
Note that xp
3v
t
+x2
is increasing in x, so the maximum value it can take in this region is
p
v
5tp
3v
t
+ v
5t
= 1
4
. Similarly, tx2  0 and p1  2v3 . Thus,
d
 
CS1   R13

dx
 v  

5
3
  1
12

2v
3
=   v
18
< 0.
So, R1
3
rises more quickly than CS1 as x increases, which means that CS1 < 13R1 for all
x in this region. Thus, in the region where p0 =
2t

v
t
 ( 12 x)
2

3
, we have
CS0   CS1 > 1
3
(R0  R1).
This condition means that if R0  R1 for a particular x, then CS0  CS1 and, in turn,
W0  W1 for the same x. Hence, mandating full disclosure is harmful.
When 3
4
 v
t
< 1, if S sends a partially-revealing message, he charges a price p0 =
t

v
t
   1
2
  x2   1
4

for 1
2
 
q
v
t
  3
4
< x  1
2
. As argued before, in this region, CS0
t
=
4
3
 
1
4
3=2
= 1
6
. In the following, I rst show for the same region that CS1
t
is increasing in
v
t
, and then show that maxx CS1t evaluated at
v
t
= 1 is less than 1
6
. First, note that CS1
can be rewritten as
CS1 = (v   tx2   p1)x  2t
3
x3 +
2t
3

v   p1
t
3=2
+
4t
3
x3
= t

v   p1
t

x+
2t
3

v   p1
t
3=2
  t
3
x3.
Next, observe that
d
 
v p1
t

d
 
v
t
 = 1  2
9
0@3 + 3x
2
q
3v
t
+ x2
1A = 1
3
  x
3
q
3v
t
+ x2
> 0.
Since CS1
t
is increasing in v p1
t
, it is also increasing in v
t
. When v
t
= 1, it is easy to show
that v p1
t
= 1
3
 p
3 + x2   x. Plugging this back into CS1 and maximizing it with respect
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x leads to argmaxxCS1  0:2256 andmaxx CS1t  0:141. This is less than 16 , which means
that CS0 > CS1 for all parameter values for which p0 = t

v
t
   1
2
  x2   1
4

.
Case 2:
p
v
5t
 x < minp v
3t
; 1
2
	
In this case, p1 = v   tx2 and thus,
CS1 =
vZ
v tx2
2
r
v   P
t
dP =
4t
3
x3.
The revenue S earns when he fully reveals x is R1 = 2t
 
v
t
  x2 x. The conditionp v
5t

x < min
p
v
3t
; 1
2
	
can equally be represented as 3x2 < v
t
 5x2, so 4tx3 < R1  8tx3.
Hence, CS1 < 13R1, which implies that
CS0   CS1 > 1
3
(R0  R1).
As argued before, in the region where p0 = t

v
t
   1
2
  x2   1
4

, CS0 = t6 . Evaluated at
x = 1
2
, CS1 = 4t3 x
3 = t
6
. Hence, CS0 > CS1 for all x < 12 in this region. Again, mandating
S to fully reveal x in situations when he voluntarily does not is socially harmful.
Case 3: min
p
v
3t
; 1
2
	  x  1
2
This case is relevant only when v
t
< 3
4
. In this region, R1 > R0 for all x (except for x = 12
where two regimes are equivalent). So, mandatory disclosure rules are unnecessary.
A3 Consumer surplus
In this section, I show that the consumer surplus expressions given in equations (4) and
(6) can alternatively be expressed in the following form:
CS1(x; v; t) =
vZ
p1(x;v;t)
D1(P ;x; v; t)dP ,
CS0(x; v; t) =
v t( 1
2
 x)2Z
p0(x;v;t)
D0(P ;x; v; t)dP .
Starting with CS1, for a given p < v,
v   p  t(  x)2  0 for all  2 L1 (p; x; v; t); H1 (p; x; v; t) .
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We can then write v   p1   t(  x)2 as
v   p1   t(  x)2 =
vZ
p1
1

v   P   t(  x)2 dP ,
for any  2 L1 (p1; x; v; t); H1 (p1; x; v; t), where 1 [] is the indicator function. Hence,
CS1(x; v; t) =
H1 (p1;x;v;t)Z
L1 (p1;x;v;t)
(v   p1   t(  x)2)d
=
H1 (p1;x;v;t)Z
L1 (p1;x;v;t)
vZ
p1(x;v;t)
1

v   P   t(  x)2 dPd
=
vZ
p1(x;v;t)
H1 (p1;x;v;t)Z
L1 (p1;x;v;t)
1

v   P   t(  x)2 ddP
=
vZ
p1(x;v;t)

H1 (P; x; v; t)  L1 (P; x; v; t)

dP
=
vZ
p1(x;v;t)
D1(P ;x; v; t)dP ,
where the forth line follows from the following three observations:
v   P   t(  x)2  0 for  2 L1 (P; x; v; t); H1 (P; x; v; t) ;
L1 (p1; x; v; t)  L1 (P; x; v; t) for all P 2 [p1(x; v; t); v] ,
H1 (p1; x; v; t)  H1 (P; x; v; t) for all P 2 [p1(x; v; t); v] .
To establish the equivalence for CS0, rst note that due to the symmetry of the
uniform distribution around 1
2
and the fact that
L0   12  = H0   12 , it follows that
H0R
L0
 d
H0  L0
= 1
2
. Thus, we have the following equality:
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H0Z
L0
(  x)2 d
H0   L0
=
H0Z
L0
 
2   2x+ x2 d
H0   L0
=
H0Z
L0

2   x+ x2 +

1
2
  

d
H0   L0
=
H0Z
L0
1
2
 
(2   2x+ x2) + (2   2 (1  x) + (1  x)2) d
H0   L0
=
H0Z
L0
1
2
 
(  x)2 + t(1  x  )2 d
H0   L0
.
Now, the equivalence of the two consumer surplus expressions can be shown as follows.
CS0(x; v; t) =
H0 (p0;x;v;t)Z
L0 (p0;x;v;t)
(v   p0   t(  x)2)d
=
H0 (p0;x;v;t)Z
L0 (p0;x;v;t)

v   p0   t
2
 
(  x)2 + (1  x  )2 d
=
H0 (p0;x;v;t)Z
L0 (p0;x;v;t)
vZ
p0(x;v;t)
1

v   P   t
2
 
(  x)2 + (1  x  )2 dPd
=
vZ
p0(x;v;t)
H0 (p0;x;v;t)Z
L0 (p0;x;v;t)
1

v   P   t
2
 
(  x)2 + (1  x  )2 ddP
=
v t( 1
2
 x)2Z
p0(x;v;t)
D0(P ;x; v; t)dP .
The upper bound of the integral in the last line above becomes v  t(1
2
  x)2 because
D0 = 0 for all  for prices above v   t(12   x)2.
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Figure 1. Expected demand curves S faces for x = 0.3 
when v = 0.6 and t = 1.
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Figure 2. The set of fully revealed locations (indicated by double arrows)
when v = 0.6 and t = 1.
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